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Thinking as Shaped by Framing Sensitivity 
 
 
Abstract 
A major aim of the present study was to investigate effects of sensitivity-to-framing (Witkin’s 
EFT test) on rational and intuitive thinking. A booklet of relevant tests was distributed to 
university students who served as participants. It was found that field independent participants 
scored higher on rational thinking tasks than field-dependent participants did. Sensitivity-to-
framing was also found to be a better predictor of rational thinking than was analytical 
intelligence. The results are discussed and related to the more general issue how cognitive 
style may impact upon rational and intuitive thinking.  
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Introduction 
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 Sensitivity-to-framing constitutes a well-known bi-polar and one-dimensional model 
of cognitive style. It identifies an individual's perceptive behaviour while distinguishing 
object figures from the content field in which they are set (Witkin, 1973). The content field is 
a distracting or confusing background. The instrument is designed to distinguish field-
independent from field-dependent cognitive types; a rating which is claimed to be value-
neutral. Field-independent people tend to be more autonomous when it comes to the 
development of restructuring skills; that is, those skills required during technical tasks with 
which the individual is not necessarily familiar. They are, however, less autonomous in the 
development of interpersonal skills. 
This form of cognitive style may be denoted as peoples’ dependence or 
independence from their perceptual field and how it impacts their organization of impressions 
(Witkin & Asch, 1948;  Oltman, Goodenough, Witkin, Freedman & Friedman, 1975; 
Goodenough, 1976; Witkin & Goodenough, 1977; 1981). It is often referred to as sensitivity-
to-framing, and addresses consistent individual differences with regard to preferred ways of 
organizing and processing information and experiences (Messick, 1984). Thus, research 
suggests that this form of cognitive style bridges two important subfields within psychology 
namely cognition and personality  (see also Myers, 1962; Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, & 
Cox, 1977; Riding & Cheema, 1991; Riding & Sadler-Smith, 1992; Hayes & Allinson, 1994; 
Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Riding, 1997;  Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997; Hayes & Allinson, 
1998; Riding & Rayner, 1998; Sadler-Smith & Spicer, 2000; Sternberg & Zhang, 2001; 
Kirton, 2003; Zhang & Sternberg, 2006; Cools & Van den Broeck, 2007; Cools, Van den 
Brouck & Bouckenooghe, 2009; Zhang & Sternberg, 2009; Selart, 2010; Zhang, Sternberg, & 
Rayner, 2011; Armstrong, Cools & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Cools, Armstrong & Verbrigghe, 
2014). 
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The central idea of this study is to focus on the sensitivity-to-framing and thus build on 
the older research tradition that has studied the concept of field dependence-independence. It 
is assumed that the extent to which individuals are susceptible to figure-embedded framing 
has a bearing on their sensitivity to framing in other more specialized fields, such as reasoning 
in judgment and decision making tasks. Such framing is often based on the changing of 
reference points or by manipulating outcome salience and response mode (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Entman, 1993; 
Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998;  
Kuvaas & Selart, 2004; Chong & Druckman, 2007).  
A field dependent individual is influenced by the surrounding context and tends to be 
disturbed by it in the identification of the integrated figures. On the contrary, a field 
independent individual experiences fewer adaptation problems and may therefore more easily 
disregard influences from the surrounding context. Accordingly, field independent individuals 
have shorter response times and are able to detect more embedded figures (Witkin, 1973; 
Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, & Cox, 1977). 
In this study we will investigate how sensitivity-to-framing influences peoples’ 
performance on analytical reasoning tasks and preference for either analytic or intuitive 
decision styles. We will also investigate whether sensitivity-to-framing has discriminative 
validity in relation to analytical intelligence.  Our aim is to introduce sensitivity-to-framing as 
an important predictor of reasoning skills and decision making (see e.g., Stanovich & West, 
1998, 2000).   
A test measuring sensitivity-to-framing based on embedded figures was developed in 
early days by Witkin, Dyk, Fattuson, Goodenough, & Karp (1962). In this test, participants 
were introduced to a series of figures integrated into complex pictures where the task 
consisted of finding the hidden figures. Field dependent and independent individuals have 
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been observed to differ from each other in a variety of ways. For instance, field dependent 
individuals are considered to be more social, group-oriented, and socially competent than 
field independent individuals (Witkin & Goodenough, 1981; Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, & 
Cox, 1977). They are also assumed to be more sensitive to social interaction and critique, 
more externally motivated, and to a higher extent dependent on external reference points in 
managing their social life. Field independent individuals, on the other hand, are often 
described as more internal in their locus of control, more internally motivated, and more 
analytically task focused (Fritz, 1994; Liu & Reed, 1994; Lyons-Lawrence, 1994; Reiff, 1996; 
Riding & Cheema, 1991). Evidence from recent studies also suggests that sensitivity-to-
framing correlates with intelligence, working memory, and verbal/spatial abilities (Jones, 
1997; Linn & Kyllonen, 1981; Lópes-Rupérez, Palacios, & Sanches, 1991; MacLeod, 
Jackson, & Palmer, 1986; McKenna, 1984; Miyake, Witzki, & Emerson, 2001; Moutier, 
Angeard, & Houdé, 2002; Tsaparlis, 2005).  
Furthermore, field independent individuals seem to remember more of the surrounding 
context of an event whereas field dependent individuals are much more attentive to details 
(Eagle, Goldberger, & Breitman, 1969).   
Based on this reasoning, we make the following two hypotheses: 
H1: Field independent individuals will be able to think more rational than field dependent 
individuals. 
H2: Field dependent individuals will report higher levels of intuitive thinking than field 
independent individuals. 
This means that field dependent individuals are assumed to have more difficulty 
garnering the necessary mental capacity for the controlled cognitive processes associated with 
analytical decision making. Thus, field dependent individuals should perform less well on 
these tasks than field independent individuals.  
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The Impact of Sensitivity-to-Framing vs. Cognitive Ability on Analytical and Intuitive 
Decision Processes 
Stanovich and West (1998) have found that individual difference with regard to 
cognitive ability is greatest at a lower algorithmic level. However, individual differences 
concerning thinking dispositions, at a rational level, are informed by availability to a higher 
degree. This concept addresses the simplicity by which impressions produced by the situation 
are perceived. Based on this reasoning, it seems plausible to assume that sensitivity-to-
framing may better explain differences in both rational and intuitive ability.   
Thus, we propose the following:  
H3:  Sensitivity-to-framing is expected to explain differences in rational and intuitive 
thinking better than analytical intelligence. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The study was based on responses obtained from 72 students at Linnaeus University who 
participated voluntarily and without any payment. Participants’ ages ranged from 19-40 years 
(M = 23, 5; SD = 4.16). Nearly as many men as women took part in the study, that is, 48.6 % 
were male and 51.4% were female. Only two participants did not complete the experiment. 
Material 
The present study is based on four tests that measure sensitivity-to-framing, analytical 
intelligence, self-rated intuition, and rationality. Participants’ were also asked about their age 
and gender. 
 
Part I – Sensitivity-to-framing  
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We applied the Gottschaldt test in order to measure sensitivity-to-framing in line with 
Witkin’s development of his Embedded Figures Test. The Gottschaldt test is a paper and 
pencil test where a participant’s task is to find a simple geometric figure in a distractingly 
complex pattern. This is followed by being asked to mark the figure when it is found. A broad 
range of  such tasks were applied in the test and participants marked as many figures as they 
were able to perceived during a specified time limit (2 minutes per sub-task). Depending on 
the performance, participants received a variety of scores for the correctly marked figures. 
They could maximally obtain 47 points. According to Witkin et al. (1962) to be classified as 
field dependent, participants should lie half a standard deviation below the mean, whereas 
they should be half a standard deviation above the mean to be classified as field independent 
(M = 27, 4, SD = 8.10, N = 72). Witkin used response latency time per task as his measure of 
field dependence performance. Instead, we chose to distribute scores depending on the 
amount of correctly marked figures perceived within a time limit. The aim was to differentiate 
participants’ thinking styles in this connection, since we did not have the time and resources 
to test each participant with Witkin’s method. The internal consistency was high (α = .84). 
Part 2 – Analytical Intelligence 
The test we applied in this context is a less advanced and less extensive version of 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices. It has been used by Mensa Sweden and we had their 
chairman’s approval to use it. Broadly speaking, Raven’s matrices are assumed to be reliable 
in the measurement of analytical intelligence (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). Thus we found 
an internal consistency of  .75 using the split-half technique on a pilot group of 40 students. In 
addition we observed a test-retest reliability of .79 when we retested the material one week 
later on the same group. These results are very much in line with the reliability results from 
the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM). With regard to validity, we have been informed by 
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the chairman that the test should correlate between .75 - .82 with WISC-R scores obtained 
from a group of students.  
The matrices are designed to measure the cognitive processes that, from a theoretical 
point of view, are assumed to drive general intelligence (Mackintosh, 1998). Recently, 
Stanovich and West (1998) used this test in order to measure analytical intelligence in their 
studies on rational thinking. The test that we applied included 18 sub-tasks, and participants 
could therefore maximally obtain 18 points on the test (M = 9.63, SD = 4.35, N = 72). A time 
limit of 10 minutes for the entire test was applied. The internal consistency was high (α = 
.90). 
Part 3 – Intuitive Thinking 
The test used in this context was inspired by a test developed by Adelbratt (2004) 
measuring self-rated intuition in decision situations. In our test, participants were introduced 
to a series of everyday decision situations related to personal relationships, education, job 
alternatives, personal finances etc. The participants’ task is to indicate to what degree they 
used their intuition/gut feeling in the presented six situations. A Likert Scale with seven levels 
was used to measure responses. The lowest degree of intuition (Not at all) rendered 1 point 
whereas the highest degree (Exclusively) rendered 7 points.  This implied a maximum score 
of 42 points (M = 27.8, SD = 3.9, n = 50). The internal consistency was in the lower range of 
what may be regarded as acceptable (α = .81). 
Part 4 – Analytical thinking 
The rationality test consists of two separate parts, focusing on syllogisms and statistical 
reasoning. The syllogism tasks should be solved by taking into account deductive reasoning. 
These tasks include two premises and one conclusion. Premises and conclusions are not 
always obtained from the real world to test the ability to think logically (ex. premises: P1 All 
leaders are managers, P2 Mahatma Gandhi was a leader, Conclusion: Mahatma Gandhi was a 
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manager). Hence, the goal was to judge whether or not the conclusion was logically correct or 
incorrect on the basis of the premises, without being influenced by the real world appearance 
of the latter. The syllogism test was based on a study presented by Markovits and Nantels 
(1989) that also served as inspiration for Stanovich and West (1998). Each correct answer 
rendered a score of one and incorrect answers resulted in a score of zero.  
The test of statistical reasoning, on the other hand, is based on inductive reasoning and 
has also been previously used by Stanovich and West (1998) as stimulus material. The test 
was modified such that it would suite Scandinavian conditions. Hence, six decision scenarios 
were created where each task described a bipolar decision situation where one of the 
situations was supported by a statistical majority and the other was more individual and based 
on a subjective opinion. Each task included four rating scale options including the two end 
poles. Participants received scores depending on the extent to which their responses coincided 
with the statistical majority options. Four levels of scores were distributed (Alternative A, 
most certainly = 2; Alternative A, probably = 1.5; Alternative B, probably = 0.5; Alternative 
B, most certainly = 0) such that the highest levels represented the statistical majority options 
and the lowest denoted the individual and subjective options.  The results from the two 
separate rationality tests were added in order to obtain a maximal total rationality score of 22 
points (syllogisms: max 10 points; statistical reasoning: max 12 points) (n = 72, M = 13.96, 
SD = 3.12).  
Procedure 
A series of pilot tests was conducted in order to create a booklet of reliable tests. These tests 
were subsequently conducted in two larger classes including undergraduate psychology 
students. The entire sessions lasted for about 30-40 minutes and specific time restrictions 
were imposed on the two introductory cognitive tests (cognitive style and analytical 
intelligence). The cognitive style test included five subtests that each had a time restriction set 
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to two minutes. In the remaining three tests, (intuition, syllogisms, and statistical reasoning), 
no time restrictions were applied. Here, participants could use as much time as they wanted to 
fulfil the tasks. An experiment leader was always present during the sessions in order to assist 
and make oral clarifications. Before submission, all participants were instructed to check that 
all items had been properly filled in.   
Results 
Our first hypothesis implies that field dependent individuals will be better rational 
performers than framing susceptible ones. This hypothesis was tested by using a one way 
ANOVA with sensitivity-to-framing (field dependent, field independent) as the independent 
variable and rationality scores as the dependent variable (F(1, 46) = 24.16, p<.001, η2 = .354). 
A reliable main effect was detected indicating support for Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 1 for a 
graphical illustration).  
Figure 1 about here 
Our second hypothesis states that field dependent individuals should use intuitive 
reasoning processes to a higher extent than field independent individuals. This hypothesis was 
tested with a one way ANOVA with sensitivity-to-framing (field dependent, field 
independent) as the independent variable and self rated intuition as the dependent variable (F 
(1, 40) = 6.81, p<.10, η2 = .12). A marginally reliable main effect was observed in support of 
Hypothesis 2 (see Figure 2 for a graphical illustration). 
Figure 2 about here 
Our third hypothesis suggests that sensitivity-to-framing should better predict the 
dependent variables than analytical intelligence. In order to establish this, we first performed a 
correlation analysis of all the main variables (see Table 1). 
Table 1 about here 
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Second, this hypothesis was tested with two step-wise multiple regression analyses 
(MRAs). In the first analysis, rationality was used as the criterion (dependent) variable and 
analytical intelligence and cognitive style were applied as the independent variables, while 
controlling for age and gender (see Table 2). Here, two reliable predictors were found to 
better explain the variance observed in the dependent variable than analytical intelligence, 
namely cognitive style (β = .56,  p<.0.001) and age (β = .22, p<.05). Analytical intelligence 
only revealed a weak tendency to become significant (β = .17, p = .12). The collinearity 
between sensitivity-to-framing and analytical intelligence was tested as a manipulation check 
and revealed a correlation of r = .383, p < 0.001. This result was judged as satisfactory as the 
critical limit value is normally set to somewhere in between .60 and .70. 
Table 2 about here 
In the second stepwise multiple regression analysis we applied the same predictors but 
used self-rated intuition as the criterion (dependent) variable. Here, neither sensitivity-to-
framing nor analytical intelligence was able to predict self-rated intuition reliably. (see Table 
3). However, age did predict self-rated intuition  (β = -.36, p <.01).  
Table 3 about here 
Gender as a covariat to cognitive style 
In an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) gender was tested as a covariat to sensitivity-
to-framing as the independent variable and rationality as the dependent one. Here, it was 
revealed that gender was a marginal explanator of the results revealed in connection with the 
test of Hypothesis 1  (F (1, 46) = 21.24, p < .001, η2 = .33). 
 
Discussion 
The main purpose of the present study was to investigate the importance of sensitivity-
to-framing on rational performance and self-rated intuition. Another important aim was to 
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clarify if sensitivity-to-framing would better predict rationality and intuitive processing than 
analytical intelligence. The results clearly indicated a difference in how field dependent and 
field independent individuals perform rationally and intuitively. Sensitivity-to-framing was 
found to be a better predictor of rational performance than analytical intelligence. 
Additionally, sensitivity-to-framing was perceived to be a better predictor of self-rated 
intuition than was analytical intelligence.  
During the last decade, there have been numerous studies that have looked at the impact 
of thinking style and cognitive capacity on peoples’ reasoning and decision making (e.g., 
Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000). Most often, the need for cognition (NfC) has been chosen as 
the focal thinking style. However, the predictive power of NfC on peoples’ reasoning skills 
has been difficult to establish in these studies. The contribution of the present paper lies in the 
identification of sensitivity-to-framing as a quite good predictor of reasoning skills and 
decision making. Additionally, findings from previous research establishing strong 
correlations between sensitivity-to-framing and analytical intelligence (e.g., Linn & Kyllonen, 
1981; Lópes-Rupérez, Palacios, & Sanches, 1991; Tsaparlis, 2005) have been replicated. 
Furthermore, we have extended this research through showing that sensitivity-to-framing 
seems to be related to both analytical and intuitive decision making in a rather systematic 
way.  
Sensitivity-to-framing appears to better than intelligence be able to predict reasoning 
skills and analytical decision making. A parallel may be drawn to the area of inhibition. It has 
been shown lately that inhibitory capacity tests can be a better predictor of reasoning 
performance than more general ability tests (e.g., Markovits & Doyon, 2004). A clear-cut 
relationship between inhibition training and field dependence has also been observed 
(Moutier, Angeard, & Houdé, 2002). Thus, inhibition may, like field dependence, include a 
broader range of complex capabilities in comparison to analytical intelligence. For instance, 
Sensitivity-to-Framing 13 
 
 
an interesting issue to consider could be how field dependence is connected to inhibition, 
since there are indeed many similar traits. 
The obtained results were clearly in support of Hypothesis 1. Field independent 
individuals performed significantly better on the rationality tasks than field dependent 
individuals. In order to perform well on our rationality test (syllogisms and statistical 
reasoning) the ability to de-contextualize the logics and find the primary problems in the 
presented information appears to be crucial (Stanovich & West, 1998). An interpretation of 
why sensitivity-to-framing correlates more with the rational thinking test than does the Raven 
thus suggests that field dependence is indistinguishable from spatial ability.  So, the 
correlation between sensitivity-framing and rational thinking could largely be mediated by a 
shared component of spatial ability (see also Chater, 1996, 1997, 1999; Chater & Vitanyi, 
2003).  
However, Hypothesis 2 was only marginally supported. Our results revealed that 
sensitivity-to-framing also leads to differences in self-rated intuition but the effect was found 
only to be marginally reliable. Here, field dependent individuals reported a higher degree of 
self rated intuition than what field independent individuals did. However, this finding only 
revealed a very marginal significance. This tendency may therefore be regarded as a 
hypothesis which has not yet been falsified and would be a reasonable work hypothesis for 
future studies. An explanation of this tendency could be that field independent individuals 
tend to select more analytical decision strategies (lower scores on the intuition test) in order to 
deliberately assure themselves that they have chosen the best possible alternative. As field 
dependent individuals performed worse on the rationality test, it may be assumed that they 
prefer to apply their intuitive capabilities (higher score on the intuition test) rather than more 
analytically and reason-based approaches. Several studies confirm that field independent 
individuals are more task oriented, more attentive to detail, and more analytical than field 
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dependent individuals (Chinien & Boutin, 1992, 1993; Fritz, 1994; Liu & Reed, 1994; Lyons-
Lawrence, 1994; Reiff, 1996; Riding & Cheema, 1991). It may be suggested that field 
dependent and field independent individuals are implicitly or explicitly aware of their rational 
and analytical capacity and tend to select their level of applied intuition accordingly.  
Finally, we received mixed support for Hypothesis 3. Sensitivity-to-framing was 
revealed to be a better predictor of rational performance than analytical intelligence. This 
result may be interpreted such that sensitivity-to-framing includes a broader range of complex 
capabilities compared with analytical intelligence. This fact should explain the difference with 
regard to rational performance. There are several studies that support this interpretation 
revealing high degrees of correlation between cognitive style and several other cognitive 
abilities (Elliott, 1961; Jackson, 1956; Sternberg, 1997). However, our results showed that 
neither sensitivity-to-framing nor analytical intelligence was able to predict self rated 
intuition.  Nevertheless, a marginal ability was observed for sensitivity-to-framing. It is 
possible that this ability could have been verified if we had not operationalized at such a 
general level.  
 
Limitations 
Our test of sensitivity-to-framing had very high reliability, with a good distribution. 
Nevertheless, our time pressure and scoring procedures may be questioned, since they have 
not been tried before. Still, the results, in this context, seem to indicate a good distinction 
between participants’ performances. The test of analytical intelligence also received high 
reliability scores with a good distribution. We decided to apply only one test of analytical 
intelligence in order to better be able to focus on the relationship between sensitivity-to-
framing and analytical intelligence. Another reason was to limit the use of tests in the entire 
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study. Given this, we only used the instrument in order to measure the analytical part of 
intelligence, which is part of general intelligence. 
With regard to our intuition test, it must be revealed that the concept was difficult to 
operationalize, since intuition is built on individual experiences and is not open for 
introspection. For this reason, it became too complicated to test intuitive performance. 
Instead, we tested participants’ attitudes toward using their intuition in a couple of scenarios. 
Through this, we obtained indirect measures on their use of intuition.  
Focusing on the test of rational performance, we relied to a great extent on material 
developed by Stanovich and West (1998). Since this test material has been used to a large 
degree by other scientists, and is widely cited, reliability has been externally established and 
recognised. Consequently, we believe that we can rely on the two tests of theirs that have 
been applied in our study. It is important to note, however, that our measure of rationality 
only rests on syllogisms and statistical reasoning. We would have optimally liked to have 
applied more dimensions of rationality, in line with Stanovich and West. Nevertheless, in 
order to limit our general number of tests, we believed it to be satisfactory to test inductive 
and deductive reasoning (statistical reasoning vs. syllogisms) as a means to measure rational 
performance in a reliable way. 
Another issue is that we only used a limited section of a full scale IQ test and that the 
validity of this section only has only been partially established (Ravens matrices). For this 
reason, it may be argued that the criticism directed towards IQ tests lacks validity. However, 
it must be noted that Ravens’ matrices have been used extensively in practical settings as a 
useful assessment tool for IQ. The Progressive Matrices have been described as one of the 
purest and best measures of g or general intellectual functioning, available. 
Finally, it must be noted that the present study is purely correlational and do not provide 
any experimental support. For instance, the original Stanovich and West studies have recently 
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been followed-up by secondary task studies that showed that a lack of executive resources is 
directly causing faulty analytic reasoning and decision making (de Neys, 2006).   
Future research 
A great challenge lies in trying to establish the effect of sensitivity-to-framing on 
intuitive decision making. The present results only give an indication of a partial connection, 
and the scale measuring self-reported intuition has not yet been thoroughly validated. If this 
connection could be more fully established it would give further support for the notion that 
the availability heuristic (Kahneman, 2003; Selart, Kuvaas, Boe, & Takemura, 2006) plays a 
major part in explaining the influence of sensitivity-to-framing on analytical and intuitive 
decision making.  
It would also be interesting to study the role of syllogisms more in detail. An important 
division may be made between abstract syllogisms and syllogisms with a belief-logic conflict. 
Stanovich and West have used both types in their studies. Focusing on belief-laden 
syllogisms, it would be perfectly possible to partial out the effects of logic and believability 
on two separate indices (e.g., see Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004). In 
such a case, field independent individuals should score higher on the logical index whereas 
field dependent individuals should score higher on the belief-based index. Such results would 
in many ways clarify the relation between field dependence and inhibition.  
Implications for practice.  
The findings in this study have several possible implications for practice. Organizations seek 
to hire and promote individuals with solid analytical decision making skills (Hunt, 
Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry, 1989; Chan, 1996; Graff, 2003; Sadler-Smith & Smith, 2004; 
Kozhevnikov, 2007) . Some companies explicitly test for reasoning abilities or even 
intelligence. This study shows that field dependence does explain a sizable portion of the 
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variation in performance on analytical skills. Moreover, we have demonstrated that field 
dependence shows discriminative validity in relation to intelligence.  
However, intelligence testing has been criticized for assessing limited and in some cases 
irrelevant skills when applied to real life contexts. Other criticisms are that intelligence tests 
are too elementary and fail to capture cognitive creative problem solving capabilities by 
asking people to choose one correct answer (Menkes, 2005).  
In contrast to intelligence tests, tests of sensitivity-to-framing provide an indication of 
peoples’ ability to de-contextualize; an ability that is immediately useful in real life, as people 
in everyday life are forced to absorb and digest vast amounts of information. How people 
handle information and their ability to apply analytical thinking in situations where there exist 
an abundance of (sometimes) superfluous information is most likely highly relevant to how an 
employee performs in his or her job. For instance, it has been shown by Hodgkinson, Bown, 
Maule, and Glaister (1999) that the framing bias is likely to be an important factor in 
judgment and decision making and the ability to work with cognitive mapping provides an 
effective means of limiting the damage accruing from this bias.  
A second implication is that people depending on their sensitivity-to-framing seem to 
apply different strategies of decision making. If field dependent individuals apply different 
tactics and strategies from field independent individuals, this knowledge would be useful for 
organizations to better assist employees in improving on their analytical and decision making 
skills. Field dependent individuals may through training become better at de-contextualizing 
information and thus become better at their decision making skills, or they may, by becoming 
aware of their cognitive style, develop meta-skills by which they are able to monitor and 
choose optimal strategies based on their cognitive style. According to Klein (1998), it is 
important that people in organizations understand that the perspective that they employ 
provides a set of values and salient issues that influence the factors that we consider in our 
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decision-making processes. As a result it influences our final choice. Field dependent 
decision-makers train themselves in developing a full understanding of the situation by 
explicitly viewing decision problems from divergent perspectives. Such different frames may, 
for instance, include an engineering/technology frame, a sales/marketing frame, a production 
frame, a political frame, a legal frame, an accounting/finance frame, a competitive frame, and 
an ethical frame.  
Finally, there may be tasks and areas in which field dependents excel. The creativity 
research literature thus emphasizes the role of intuition in producing novel and creative ideas. 
Highly creative people have been found to be highly receptive to contextual cues just like 
field dependent individuals. Testing people for field dependence then may be used to place 
people in areas in which these specific skills are likely to be particularly useful and in which 
the possible drawbacks from field dependence are less prominent.   
Rather than seeing either analytical or intuitive strategies as superior to each other, 
optimal strategies may combine these strategies and apply them to different stages in a 
decision making process. Nevertheless, how such combinations are achieved will depend on 
how sensitivity-to-framing is perceived. If sensitivity-to-framing is found to be a fixed 
personality trait, combinations will have to be achieved through the composition of work 
groups. If sensitivity-to-framing can be taught or influenced, individuals may be able to adapt 
their sensitivity-to-framing to different problems.  
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Table 1.  
 
A correlational analysis (Pearson) of the main variables (N=72) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Variables     1  2     3     4 
_______________________________________________________________________________
  
1.Field dependence-independence  -  .383**  -.130    .555** 
 
2. Intelligence          -      .019    .360**
  
3. Intuition              -  -.204 
 
4. Analytical decision making 
_______________________________________________________________________________  
**significant, p<,01. *significant, p<,05.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
A multiple step-wise regression analysis based on predictors of rationality (n = 67) 
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Variables    B  β  p 
Step 1 
 
    Cognitive style   .21 (.04) .56  <.001 
 
Excluded Variables 
 
    Analytical Intelligence    .17  .12 
 
    Gender                          -.07  .53 
 
    Age       .22  .04 
 
 
Step 2 
 
    Cognitive style   .23 (.04) .59  <.001 
 
    Age     .17 (.08) .22  .04 
 
Excluded Variables 
 
    Analytical Intelligence    .18  .09 
 
    Gender                          -.06  .59 
Note: B is a non-standardized regression coefficient with the standard error in parantheses; β 
is the standardized regression coefficient; R = .56, R2 = .31, F = 29.45, p<.001 for Step 1; R = 
.60, R2 = .35, F = 17.81, p<.001 for Step 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
 
A multiple step-wise regression analysis based on predictors of self-rated intuition (n = 49) 
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Variables    B  β  p 
Step 1 
 
    Age     -.48 (.18) -.36  .01 
 
Excluded Variables 
 
    Cognitive style     -.17  .15 
 
    Analytical Intelligence      .01  .96 
 
    Gender        .22  .36 
 
Note: B is a non-standardized regression coefficient with the standard error in parantheses; β is 
the standardized regression coefficient; R = .36, R2 = .13, F = 7.20, p = .01 for Step 1 
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Figure 1. Mean scores of Field Dependent Individuals (n = 22) and Field Independent 
Individuals (n = 24) with regard to rationality 
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Figure 2. Mean scores of Field Dependent Individuals (n = 15) and Field Independent 
Individuals (n = 15) with regard to self-rated intuition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
